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People with major depressive disorder (MDD) are more prone to experiencing moral emo-
tions related to self-blame, such as guilt and shame. DSM-IV-TR recognizes excessive
or inappropriate guilt as one of the core symptoms of current MDD, whereas excessive
shame is not part of the criteria for MDD. However, previous studies specifically assess-
ing shame suggested its involvement in MDD. In the first part of this review, we will
consider literature discussing the role of self-blaming moral emotions in MDD. These self-
blaming moral emotions have been purported to influence people when they make social
and financial decisions in cognitive studies, particularly those using neuroeconomical par-
adigms. Such paradigms aim to predict social behavior in activities of daily living, by using
important resource tangibles (especially money) in laboratory conditions. Previous litera-
ture suggests that guilt promotes altruistic behavior via acting out reparative tendencies,
whereas shame reduces altruism by means of increasing social and interpersonal distance.
In the second part of this review, we will discuss the potential influence of self-blaming
moral emotions on overt behavior in MDD, reviewing clinical and experimental studies in
social and financial decision-making, in which guilt, and shame were manipulated. This is
not a well-established area in the depression literature, however in this opinion paper we
will argue that studies of moral emotions and their impact on behavioral decision-making
are of potential importance in the clinical field, by linking specific symptoms of a disorder
to a behavioral outcome which may lead to stratification of clinical diagnoses in the future.
Keywords: guilt, shame, major depressive disorder, neuroeconomics, social-economical decision making,
neuroimaging
But they whose guilt within their bosoms lie, Imagine every eye
beholds their blame, For Lucrece thought he blush’d to see her
shame.
The Rape of Lucrece, William Shakespeare
INTRODUCTION
Moral emotions (e.g., guilt, shame, indignation, prosocial forms of
pride, gratitude) are discussed as of a critical evolutionary impor-
tance (Gintis et al., 2008). It has been suggested that humans
acquired the capacity to feel these emotions over the course of evo-
lution to motivate behavior that is directed toward other people’s
or societal needs, thereby promoting social cooperation (Zahn
et al., 2012). The relationship between moral emotions and social
behavior has been of interest to philosophers since the Classi-
cal periods. More recently the relationship has been considered by
clinicians and social psychologists, and moral emotion has become
a “hot topic” in neuroscience, with the emergence of “social
neuroscience” as a distinct discipline (Ochsner and Lieberman,
2001).
Healthy functioning of a moral emotion system forms the
basis of balancing selfish needs with those of other people. Its
dysfunction can lead to certain types of psychopathology. For
example, lack of moral emotions such as sympathy and guilt has
been mentioned among the key personality traits of psychopathic
individuals (Hare, 1985; Mahmut et al., 2008; Haji, 2010). By con-
trast, the experience of self-blaming moral emotions, such as guilt,
shame, and self-contempt/disgust can be exaggerated in mood dis-
orders (Zahn et al., 2012). In the case of major depression, guilt is
often exaggerated, and experienced out of context (Prosen et al.,
1983), and is recognized as one of the core symptoms: “feelings of
worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt nearly every day
(not merely self-reproach or guilt about being sick)” (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000).
In the first part of this opinion paper (See Self-blaming Moral
Emotions in Major Depressive Disorder and Hypotheses Regard-
ing the Impact of Self-Blaming Emotions on Social-Economical
Decision Making), we will discuss the role of self-blaming moral
emotions (guilt and shame) in major depressive disorder (MDD).
There is emerging evidence for the role of self-contempt/disgust
in MDD (Green et al., 2013), but this is not further reviewed
because the relative paucity of evidence. We will focus on review-
ing evidence from behavioral and neuroimaging studies in people
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with clinical diagnoses of major depression, and will only briefly
mention some of the studies in healthy populations with and
without symptoms. It is beyond the scope of this paper to pro-
vide an overview of studies of guilt and shame in populations
that were not assessed using diagnostic interviews. A recent meta-
analysis has addressed this issue and provided evidence for the
relationship between guilt, shame, and depression in patient popu-
lations as well as individuals reporting depressive symptoms (Kim
et al., 2011). In the second part (See A Brief Introduction to Neu-
roeconomical Paradigms onward), we will discuss the impact of
these self-blaming moral emotions on decision-making. Consid-
ering neuroeconomical studies in clinical, subclinical and healthy
populations with mood induction, we will aim to highlight the
potential implications of their findings for social-economical deci-
sion making in major depression. For the purposes of clarity,
the present review will use “major depression” only when refer-
ring to studies conducted in people with clinical diagnoses of
depression.
GENERAL CLINICAL ASPECTS OF MAJOR DEPRESSIVE
DISORDER
Major depression is a complex disorder with impairments in
cognitive, emotional, and neurobiological domains. Various eti-
ological models suggest that a combination of developmental,
psychosocial, neurobiological, and genetic factors cause MDD
(Kendler et al., 2006; Sjoholm et al., 2009). The key symptoms
of major depression are persistent low mood, severe reduction in
energy, and interest, intense feelings of worthlessness, hopeless-
ness and; in about half of the patients, also excessive guilt. These
symptoms are observed cross-culturally (Sartorius et al., 1980).
Overall these features make depression a leading cause of disabil-
ity in the western world (Eaton et al., 2008). Lifetime prevalence of
depressive disorders is estimated at 16% in the UK (Sahakian et al.,
2010) rising to 17.1% in the urban UK population (Ayuso-Mateos
et al., 2001). The annual cost of mental health disorders reach as
high as £77 billion in the UK when secondary costs arising from
broader impacts such as reduced work efficiency are considered
(Beddington et al., 2008). These figures, which are representative
of the prevalence and social cost of depression throughout the
developed world, justify the need for continuous, interdiscipli-
nary research on depression, focusing on factors that constitute
vulnerability and as well as factors that promote resilience to
MDD.
SELF-BLAMING MORAL EMOTIONS IN MAJOR DEPRESSIVE
DISORDER
There are several self-conscious moral emotions (e.g., guilt, shame,
and prosocial forms of pride; (Tangney, 2002), and it has been
argued that certain of these are selectively enhanced in MDD
(Zahn et al., 2012). Guilt and shame can be defined as “self-
blaming moral emotions,” as distinct from other moral emotions
such as indignation, related to blaming others (other-blaming)
or self-praising moral emotions such as pride. Vulnerability to
MDD has been associated with elevated levels of self-blaming
emotions compared with other-blaming emotions (Green et al.,
2013) as predicted by attributional models of MDD (Abramson
et al., 1978).
THE ROLE OF GUILT IN MAJOR DEPRESSIVE DISORDER
Excessive or out of context (inappropriate) guilt has been rec-
ognized as one of the distinctive clinical symptoms of MDD,
especially of the melancholic subtype (American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation, 2000). In a developmental psychological study in healthy
children, it was shown that excessive or inappropriate guilt
becomes less normative with age, as children make less predictive
errors in explaining cause and effect relationships (Tilghman-
Osborne et al., 2012). These authors suggest that excessive or
inappropriate guilt becomes exponentially depressotypic with age.
A recent meta-analysis showed that levels of guilt on the Hamilton
Depression scale were higher in younger adults with current major
depression compared with older adults (Hegeman et al., 2012). It
is unclear, however, how representative the included studies were
of the respective younger and older populations. Another study
showed that parental guilt induction is more significant than the
influence of parental depressive symptoms on the way children
internalized their parent’s problems, which may be an additional
vulnerability feature for adult MDD in these high-risk popula-
tions (Rakow et al., 2011). The symptom profiles of female patients
with recurrent MDD, suggest that worthlessness and excessive guilt
are the most discriminating factors for patients with and with-
out history of suicide attempts (Bi et al., 2012). Other previous
studies showed that patients with current MDD have significantly
elevated levels of guilt measured on scales which conceptualized
guilt in different ways: “delusional” and “affective” (Berrios et al.,
1992), “state” and “trait” (Ghatavi et al., 2002) and “survivor” and
“omnipotent responsibility” guilt (O’Connor et al., 2002).
A subtype of guilt that has been consistently reported in clini-
cal populations as an exaggerated moral emotion (Blacher, 2000;
O’Connor et al., 2002) is “survivor guilt,” associated with perceiv-
ing oneself as being better off than others (O’Connor et al., 2000).
Historically, this concept gained clinical recognition during the
Korean War, where it was noticed that when grenade explosions
claimed multiple lives, the survivors subsequently became vul-
nerable to severe depression (Blacher, 2000). Similar observations
of “post-survival” guilt were also recorded among the survivors
of World War II (O’Connor et al., 2000) and patients undergo-
ing treatment in an intensive care unit following successful organ
transplantation (Blacher, 2000). In the post-operative cases men-
tioned by Blacher (2000), survivor guilt originates from limited
availability of compatible donors helping a limited number of
patients to recover, whereas leaving others on the waiting lists.
Other forms of combat-related guilt significantly predict MDD
diagnosis, especially when it arises from inactions in the face of
observations of abusive violence, probably due to violations of
one’s own moral conduct (Marx et al., 2010). Survivor guilt scores
were elevated in people with major depression treated as inpatients
and predicted the severity of depression (O’Connor et al., 2002).
Survivor guilt scores might have further predictive value
in identifying populations who are vulnerable to future major
depressive episodes. One recent study showed that scores for
survivor and omnipotent responsibility guilt (defined as taking
responsibility for events which may be out of one’s control and feel-
ing guilty about their consequences) were significantly higher in
a population of people with MDD fully remitted from symptoms
compared with healthy subjects (Green et al., 2012). However, the
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same sample did not show elevated shame scores. These findings
suggest that elevated guilt levels may be a trait vulnerability fea-
ture, or alternatively a scar following previous episodes of MDD.
Survivor guilt may be an important construct that links research
in the area of major depression to post-traumatic stress disor-
der (PTSD), disorders with a high degree of co-occurrence. Taken
together, the studies in this section suggest that MDD is character-
ized by significantly higher levels of guilt, even when the symptoms
are fully remitted.
THE ROLE OF SHAME IN MAJOR DEPRESSIVE DISORDER
Whilst considering the role of shame in MDD, it is important to
note that despite its proposed significance, exaggerated shame is
not considered a diagnostic symptom of MDD (by contrast with
guilt). Tangney and colleagues have investigated the role of shame
in predicting depressive symptoms in healthy people using the
Test of Self-Conscious and Affect (TOSCA) scale, which assesses
indirect manifestations of affect on behavior. Their research group
conceptualized shame with attempts to deny, hide or escape the
shame-eliciting situation; as a result leading to interpersonal sep-
aration and increased social distance (Tangney et al., 2007). They
showed that shame-proneness accounts for a substantial quantity
of variance in depressive symptoms to an extent that this pattern
cannot be reduced to an attributional style (Tangney et al., 1992b).
However, they found these results in populations with no clinical
diagnosis of depression (Tangney et al., 1996, 1998). Mild depres-
sive symptoms in healthy populations could be due to a variety
of reasons other than major depression suggesting a lack of speci-
ficity. Furthermore, although social withdrawal is an important
clinical aspect of MDD, it may be more fundamental to other psy-
chiatric disorders such as social phobia or borderline personality
disorder (Rusch et al., 2007).
While shame-proneness may not be specific to depression,
there is increasing evidence that it is clinically relevant. In clin-
ical populations, it was shown that shame responses in the face of
everyday social dilemmas were elevated in current major depres-
sion and that shame-proneness as a trait increased the risk of
recurrence (Andrews, 1995; Thompson and Berenbaum, 2006).
A recent study found a significant relationship between shame
responses and severity of depression, and specifically suicidal
ideation, more strongly than elevated levels of guilt (Bryan et al.,
2013). Another study showed that patients with recurrent major
depressive episodes have significantly higher levels of shame, com-
pared with those patients who only had a single episode (Andrews
and Hunter, 1997). In children, it was shown that increased levels
of shame responses predicted the severity of major depression in
a population of preschool children as young as 3 years old (Luby
et al., 2009). This finding is particularly important as it could sug-
gest that shame-proneness in children may also be a vulnerability
factor for MDD in later life. Finally, shame reactions and self-
blame in the face of stressful life events, such as cancer diagnosis,
were associated with MDD diagnosis following the onset of cancer
(Hill et al., 2011).
A recent meta-analysis, investigated the relationship between
guilt, shame, and depressive symptoms in patients with MDD,
as well as individuals self reporting depressive symptoms (Kim
et al., 2011). Kim and colleagues showed that there is a stronger
relationship between shame and depressive symptoms relative to
the association between a generic form of guilt and depressive
symptoms. However, they suggested that the relationship between
shame and depressive symptoms was not statistically stronger than
the relationship between two maladaptive forms of guilt (i.e.,
omnipotent responsibility guilt and inappropriate/out of context
guilt) and depressive symptoms.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GUILT AND SHAME
The self-blaming moral emotions of guilt and shame are closely
linked. Previous studies have shown significant correlations
between context-dependent moral emotions such as guilt and
shame (Tangney et al., 1992a), however these constructs can be
theoretically distinguished. It is suggested that this distinction
mainly relies on participants’ ability to accurately define these
moral emotions separately when they experience them within
a social context (Tangney et al., 1996). However, patients with
MDD may be impaired in their ability to make this distinction.
A recent behavioral study provided participants with handheld
devices and probed their feelings in the course of daily activities,
using items on the Positive and Negative Affects Scale (PANAS),
to assess emotions including guilt and shame (Demiralp et al.,
2012). The authors showed that patients with MDD were less able
to differentiate between negatively valenced emotions; including
both guilt and shame. We consider these findings to be particu-
larly important as they suggest that symptomatic criteria for guilt
established on the basis of consistent patient accounts in clinical
interviews may be insensitive to discriminate guilt from shame. It
is possible that the current diagnostic criteria make an overgeneral
assumption that pathological self-blame in MDD loads onto guilt,
whilst underevaluating the role of shame.
The difficulties in classification of guilt and shame into dif-
ferent categories of moral emotions may partially arise from the
limitations of methodologies being used for their assessment (as
is often done by asking participants how they would feel in a
given hypothetical scenario). Attempts to differentiate between
these moral emotions aimed at a distinction based on: (a) types
of eliciting events, (b) social audience, and (c) the extent to which
a person attributes the failure, within the context of the elicit-
ing event, to the self, or the behavior (Tangney, 1996). Guilt is
conceptualized as a more private experience which is reactive to
norm violation, leading to behavioral self-blame. On the other
hand, shame is referred to as a more public experience which
emerges in a wider range of situations which may lead to char-
acterological self-blame (Tangney, 1996). An association of guilt
with behavioral, and shame with characterological self-blame is
consistent with JanoffBulman’s suggestions of differences between
characterological and behavioral self-blame patterns in people
with symptomatic subclinical depression (Janoffbulman, 1979).
Characterological self-blame is regarded as more depressogenic, as
it provides limited space for positive change, whereas self-blame
emerging from behavioral violations of one’s moral conduct may
subside once that behavior is modified. Two theoretical mod-
els supported the characterological versus behavioral self-blame
differentiation argument. The revised learned-helplessness model
posits that people who suffer from MDD often make internal, sta-
ble, and global attributions for negative events (Abramson et al.,
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1978). In an alternative model, Higgins (1987) suggested a differ-
entiation between guilt and shame based on different patterns of
self-discrepancies. Higgins argued that an inability to comply with
significant others’ moral standards results in shame, whereas an
inability to comply with one’s own moral standards results in guilt
(Higgins, 1987).
On the other hand, recent work by O’Connor and col-
leagues provides evidence against the general association of guilt-
proneness with behavioral self-blame by identifying charactero-
logical forms of empathy-based guilt (O’Connor et al., 1997, 1999,
2002). Using the Interpersonal Guilt Questionnaire (IGQ-67,
O’Connor et al., 1997), which captures characterological forms of
empathy-based guilt, they showed elevated scores in symptomatic
MDD (O’Connor et al., 2002). Although, empathy-based guilt may
be maladaptive for an individual with regard to group competition,
it is argued that altruistic individuals with high empathy-based
guilt may have provided survival advantages in the competition
between groups in our evolutionary history (O’Connor et al., 2000,
2012; Wilson and Wilson, 2007). Empathy-based guilt as measured
on the IGQ-67 were associated with depressive symptoms and this
association remained even when controlling for levels of shame as
measured on Tangney et al.’s scale (O’Connor et al., 1999).
FUNCTIONAL NEUROANATOMY OF GUILT AND SHAME
In this section we will consider social cognitive neuroscience stud-
ies investigating the functional neuroanatomy of guilt and shame,
and discuss whether these emotions can be distinguished based on
their functional neuroanatomy.
Shin et al. (2000) used an autobiographical episodic memory
paradigm with positron emission tomography (PET) in order to
measure regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) during guilt-related
imagery. In this study, participants rated stimuli in the guilt con-
dition as evoking shame to an extent which was not significantly
different than post-scanning guilt ratings, pointing to difficulties
teasing apart guilt and shame experimentally (Shin et al., 2000).
The authors showed that guilt relative to a neutral condition led
to rCBF increase in dorsal anterior cingulate gyrus (BA32) and
anterior insula; whilst leading to decreased rCBF in posterior
insula. A functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study
conducted in healthy subjects showed that guilt-specific stim-
uli were associated with significantly increased activation in left
posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS) and medial frontopolar
cortex (Takahashi et al., 2004). Furthermore, Takahashi and col-
leagues explored the differences in neural response between guilt
and embarrassment (an affective state closely related to shame).
They found that embarrassment activated the right anterior tem-
poral lobe and hippocampus bilaterally, compared with guilt.
More recent studies concerning the neural response to shame-
specific stimuli have been somewhat inconclusive. Wagner et al.
(2011) showed that compared with guilt, shame-specific stimuli
were not associated with selective activations. In another study,
it was shown that in post-scanning ratings, embarrassment, and
shame were the second and third most highly descriptive emotions
in defining stimuli designed to evoke guilt, as previously suggested
by the findings of Shin et al. (2000) and Morey et al. (2012). Firstly,
these authors showed that people felt significantly more guilt when
their actions affected others rather than themselves. Secondly, they
suggested that activation in ventrolateral regions of the prefrontal
cortex correlated significantly with post-scanning guilt ratings for
actions affecting other individuals. However, they did not provide
co-variation analyzes with shame ratings and consequently did
not discuss the extent to which this activation may be due to
shame or embarrassment. Basile et al. (2010) investigated neuro-
biological substrates of two other subtypes of guilt: deontological
guilt (emerging from violations of one’s own moral conduct)
and altruistic (i.e., survivor) guilt. Pairing different guilt scripts
with Ekman’s emotional faces in an event-related fMRI design,
they showed that deontological guilt activated dorsal and ventral
regions of the anterior cingulate cortex (BA 32/24), whereas altru-
istic/survivor guilt activated frontopolar regions (BA10 and BA9)
(Basile et al., 2010). Similar results were also obtained when using
script paradigms where significant frontopolar cortex activations
were observed for guilt and STS activations for embarrassment
in healthy subjects undergoing functional brain imaging (Moll
et al., 2007b). Koenigs and Tranel (2007) showed that carers of
patients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) lesions,
including the frontopolar cortex (BA10), observed less guilt; pro-
viding support for the engagement of frontopolar cortex while
people experience guilt. Furthermore, guilt induction by using
abstract socio-moral values and showed that activation in the
septal and subgenual cingulate region reflected individual differ-
ences during the experience of guilt but not indignation whilst
controlling for valence, the influence of other emotions such as
embarrassment and the psycholinguistic properties of the stimuli
(Zahn et al., 2009b). Zahn and colleagues also found the fron-
topolar cortex to be selectively activated for guilt. In another
study, activation in the subgenual cingulate region for guilt rel-
ative to a neutral condition correlated significantly with off-line
individual empathic concern ratings; an important component of
empathic moral sentiments such as guilt and compassion (Zahn
et al., 2009a).
Taken together, guilt was most reliably associated with fron-
topolar activations (i.e., BA10). This result was obtained whilst
using various control conditions [other-critical emotions such as
indignation (Moll et al., 2007a; Zahn et al., 2009c); anger toward
self (Kedia et al., 2008); embarrassment (Takahashi et al., 2004);
regret with no consequences for others (Morey et al., 2012); as well
as sadness (Basile et al., 2011)]. The subgenual cingulate cortex
(sgACC) (including the posteriorly adjacent septal area in some
studies) was selectively activated for guilt compared with indig-
nation toward others, when modeling individual variability in
empathic concern (Zahn et al., 2009a), or guilt-proneness (Zahn
et al., 2009c; Green et al., 2012). Subgenual cingulate activations
for guilt were also reproduced by independent groups using quite
different ways of inducing guilt (Basile et al., 2011; Morey et al.,
2012).
The findings of a study experimentally probing moral senti-
ments in patients with focal neurodegeneration of anterior brain
regions (frontotemporal dementia; FTD) confirmed the fMRI evi-
dence for involvement of the frontopolar and septal region in
prosocial sentiments (Moll et al., 2011). Resting-state hypometab-
olism, as a measure of neuronal dysfunction in the frontopolar cor-
tex and the septal region, was associated with impairments of pro-
cessing prosocial sentiments whilst controlling for experimentally
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probed disgust and anger. Whilst frontopolar cortex dysfunction
was associated with loss of guilt, pity, and embarrassment; sep-
tal dysfunction was specifically associated with loss of empathic
moral sentiments (guilt and pity but not embarrassment).
Other research groups investigated the impact of perceived
audience on the way people processed moral and social transgres-
sions (Finger et al., 2006). In this study, participants rated guilt
to be most relevant to moral transgressions without an audience,
whereas highest shame ratings were given to social transgressions
with an audience. This differentiation is partially in line with
Tangney’s assumption that shame results from moral or social
transgressions in the presence of a social audience (Tangney et al.,
2007). Comparing their functional neuroanatomy, the authors
showed that activation in ventrolateral prefrontal cortex is over-
lapping for both moral and social transgressions in the presence
of an audience (Finger et al., 2006). Another study investigated
brain activation changes for social gestures regarded as aver-
sive (fascist salute) relative to a generic greeting (Knutson et al.,
2008). The participants were presented with 2 s movies of an
adult male performing gestures, as they underwent a brain scan.
Separately, and out of the scanner, participants were asked to
complete different scales measuring various psychological traits.
Here, the authors showed that post-scanning shame ratings cor-
related significantly negatively with the activation in bilateral
inferior parietal lobe for the fascist salute versus the greeting
wave.
The first neuroimaging study of guilt in patients with MDD
used a psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis and reported
selective decoupling between subgenual anterior cingulate cor-
tex (sgACC) and right superior anterior temporal lobe for guilt
compared with indignation in people with MDD, fully remit-
ted from symptoms (Green et al., 2012). At the time of writing,
there are no published studies reporting regions which showed
differences for shame responses compared with any other con-
trol emotions. More importantly, despite its relevance, there are
no published studies addressing the neural response to shame in
MDD.
The regions which are critically involved in guilt and shame
have an intriguing overlap with regions implicated in depression.
Specifically, functional abnormalities in sgACC warrant specific
attention. As mentioned previously, the sgACC shows selective
activation for guilt. A recent review showed that after partial vol-
ume correction for the reduction in gray matter volume, there
is abnormal metabolism in sgACC in a patient group relative to
controls (Drevets and Savitz, 2008). Various other clinical studies
suggested that MDD is associated with structural and functional
abnormalities in sgACC (Drevets et al., 1997, 1998; Botteron et al.,
2002; Skaf et al., 2002; Greicius et al., 2007; Lehmbeck et al., 2008).
Activity in sgACC is also shown to predict treatment outcome in
major depression. For example, pre-treatment hypometabolism
for negative words in sgACC was associated with successful out-
come of cognitive behavioral therapy (Siegle et al., 2006), whereas
hypermetabolism predicted better treatment response to selec-
tive serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) (Mayberg et al., 1997;
Keedwell et al., 2010). Subgenual cingulate stimulation was further
shown to lead to a remission of major depression (Mayberg et al.,
2005).
SECTION SUMMARY
In this section, we reviewed the literature on moral emotions
and MDD. Studies consistently showed that both guilt and shame
scores are elevated in patients with MDD. Neuroimaging literature
provides insights for understanding overlapping mechanisms
between a specific symptom of a disorder (e.g., guilt) and over-
all pathophysiology. Studies investigating the functional neu-
roanatomy of guilt and/or shame in patients with MDD are very
limited. Current findings suggest that overgeneralization of guilt
in MDD is associated with functional disconnection of the ante-
rior temporal cortex and the sgACC, frontopolar, hippocampal,
and hypothalamic regions showing guilt-selective disconnection.
Previous behavioral studies suggest that there is a need to investi-
gate the functional neuroanatomy of shame in patients with MDD.
We provide a summary table of the cited literature for this section
(Table 1).
HYPOTHESES REGARDING THE IMPACT OF SELF-BLAMING
EMOTIONS ON SOCIAL-ECONOMICAL DECISION MAKING
In the previous section, we showed that it was difficult to dis-
sociate the roles of guilt and shame in MDD on the basis of
the current behavioral or functional neuroimaging evidence. In
social psychology, both guilt and shame are conceptualized to be
within the same category of moral emotions which help reduce
socially undesirable behavior (Tangney, 1996). However, in a later
work they argued that shame contributes less toward motivating
moral behavior because its adaptive functions are limited relative
to those of guilt (Tangney et al., 2007). They suggested that the
main difference between guilt and shame lies in their respective
motivations for subsequent action (Tangney et al., 1996). Guilt
is associated with an urge for reparative action (Tangney et al.,
2007). On the other hand, the most common response to shame
is to increase social distance and escape from the shame-eliciting
environment. Therefore, it is suggested that shame works counter
to reparative altruistic tendencies by means of increasing social
distance between individuals (Tangney et al., 2007). The assump-
tions regarding the reparative nature of guilt find support from
clinical research. Considering the significance of both survivor
and omnipotent responsibility guilt in MDD, O’Connor and col-
leagues argue that depression may be conceptualized as a disorder
in which the moral system is in “overdrive,” leading patients to
pathological forms of altruism and self-sacrifice (O’Connor et al.,
2007, 2012). Altruistic behavior has been defined as a form of
cooperative behavior conducted at a particular cost to the actor
toward an indiscriminate receiver in the absence of short or long
term expectancy of reciprocation (West et al., 2007). In conjunc-
tion with moral emotions, altruistic behavior can be in the form of
direct cooperation or implicated punishment as a result of norm
violation. The unique interaction between cooperation and costly
punishment is defined as “strong reciprocity,” a concept which
incorporates costly cooperation and costly punishment (Fehr and
Fischbacher, 2003).
Understanding the relationship between MDD, guilt, shame,
and altruism may be more complicated than previously proposed.
Both Tangney and O’Connor’s hypotheses have certain limita-
tions. Tangney’s hypotheses are derived mainly from undergrad-
uate student populations, which limits their validity for patients
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Table 1 |The list of the key: (A) literature which investigated guilt and shame in MDD and (B) neuroimaging literature which investigated guilt
and shame.
Reference Sample Method Moral emotion Scale Main conclusion
(A)
Demiralp et al. (2012) MDD Behavioral Guilt/shame PANAS Inability to differentiate between negative emotions in
MDD
Bryan et al. (2013) MDD Behavioral Guilt/shame Harder personal
feelings questionnaire
Shame correlates significantly with depression severity
Bi et al. (2012) MDD Behavioral Guilt SCID Excessive guilt in suicide attempters
Kim et al. (2011) MDD Meta-analysis Guilt/shame – Significant relationship between shame and depressive
symptoms
Marx et al. (2010) MDD Behavioral Guilt Laufer-parsons
inventory
Combat-related guilt mediates MDD diagnosis
Luby et al. (2009) MDD Behavioral Guilt/shame Story stem task Shame correlates significantly with depression severity
O’Connor et al. (2002) MDD Behavioral Guilt IPGQ-67 Survivor and omnipotent responsibility guilt correlates
with self-reported severity of symptoms
Berrios et al. (1992) MDD Behavioral Guilt Novel guilt scale Guilt scores correlate with self-reported symptoms
(B)
Morey et al. (2012) Healthy
subjects
fMRI Guilt Novel guilt scale Guilt activates dmPFC and vlPFC
Green et al. (2012) Remitted
MDD
fMRI Guilt/shame Value related moral
sentiments task
Decoupling between sgACC and aTL for guilt in MDD
Wagner et al. (2011) Healthy
subjects
fMRI Guilt Trait guilt
questionnaire
Guilt activates right OFC
Moll et al. (2011) Patients
with FTD
PET Guilt Moral sentiments
task
Hypoactivations in the frontopolar cortex and the septal
region are associated with impairments in processing
prosocial sentiments, including guilt and pity
Basile et al. (2011) Healthy
subjects
fMRI Guilt Deontological versus
altruistic guilt
Deontological guilt activates dorsal and ventral anterior
cingulate, whereas altruistic guilt activates frontopolar
cortex (BA 9/10)
Zahn et al. (2009a,b) Healthy
subjects
fMRI Guilt Moral sentiments
task
Activity in the sgACC in guilt relative to neutral
condition, correlates significantly with offline empathic
concern ratings
Zahn et al. (2009a,b) Healthy
subjects
fMRI Guilt Value related moral
sentiments task
Guilt in negative self agency conditions activates
septal/sgACC and regions of vmPFC
Moll et al. (2007a,b) Healthy
subjects
fMRI Guilt Moral sentiments
task
Guilt relative to neutral condition activated frontopolar
cortex and STS
Berthoz et al. (2006) Healthy
subjects
fMRI Guilt Intentional and
accidental moral
violations
Guilt activates amygdala bilaterally




Guilt activates mPFC and posterior STS
Shin et al. (2000) Healthy
subjects
PET Guilt Autobiographical guilt Increased regional cerebral blood flow in anterior
cingulate and anterior insula, and decreased rCBF in
posterior insula during guilt versus neutral condition
Studies were listed chronologically (the most recent first), so that advancements and limitations in this field of research can be observed.
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with MDD, whereas O’Connor’s hypotheses may underestimate
the role of shame in interpersonal decision-making in MDD. Both
of these assumptions rely on self-reported hypothetical behav-
ior and experience, but not actual decision-making. Although one
may argue for a direct relationship between choice preferences and
actual behavior, the results of choice behavior paradigms are usu-
ally confounded by factors such as social desirability. Therefore,
computerized behavioral paradigms may have more ecological
validity in terms of modeling how people interact with their social
environment. Here, we propose a neuro-behavioral economi-
cal approach to investigate the extent to which guilt and shame
influence social and financial decisions in patients with MDD.
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO NEUROECONOMICAL
PARADIGMS
Neuroeconomical paradigms make use of quantifiable resource
tangibles such as time, money, or amount of water to survive, so
that they activate daily life decision-making mechanisms. These
experiments are referred to as “games.” Neuroeconomical game
is defined as; “a decision problem with structure so that one’s
payoffs can depend on one’s own choices and some other input”
(Kishida et al., 2010). These features are suggested as making
neuroeconomical paradigms an ecologically valid, interdiscipli-
nary, and empirically testable framework for understanding social
impairments associated with neuropsychiatric disorders (Brune,
2002). Recently, it was suggested that average responses of indi-
viduals without any psychopathology in various neuroeconomical
decision-making paradigms may be used to design realistic social
partners for computerized tasks in order to define benchmarks of
normative behavior (King-Casas and Chiu, 2012). In the next step,
behavioral and neurobiological deviations from the benchmark
social norm may be used as quantitative biomarkers to support
clinical diagnoses. A neuroeconomical approach may also facil-
itate translational approaches, as neuroeconomic paradigms can
capture elements of social hierarchical organization, that is read-
ily observable in animals, but traditionally harder to evaluate in
humans. Indeed authors have used neuroeconomical paradigms
in order to explain optimal foraging behavior in the wild (Dubois
and Giraldeau, 2003). Although the amount of current scientific
input from clinical populations is extremely limited, these recent
suggestions are important in highlighting the potential of neuroe-
conomical paradigms as a cornerstone for the future of psychiatric
research.
In the next section, we will consider studies which have inves-
tigated the impact of guilt, shame, and depression on social-
economical decision-making, reviewing evidence from behavioral,
neuroimaging, and neuromodulatory studies in clinical, subclini-
cal populations, and healthy subjects. Our main emphasis will be
on neuroeconomical paradigms investigating various dimensions
of altruistic behaviors as an important component of social and
moral decision-making.
THE IMPACT OF SELF-BLAMING MORAL EMOTIONS ON
SOCIAL-ECONOMICAL DECISION MAKING
Previous studies have suggested that exogenous manipulations
of emotional context influence judgments about acceptability of
moral violations (Valdesolo and DeSteno, 2006). Later studies
showed that emotions with similar valence, but different psy-
chological properties, have different impacts on the way people
make moral judgments (Strohminger et al., 2011). Here, we will
discuss the diverging effects of self-blaming moral emotions on
social-economical decision making. In the later subsections, we
will consider evidence regarding the impact of depression and
neurotransmitter modulations.
THE ROLE OF GUILT
As discussed, previous literature suggests that guilt promotes altru-
istic behavior. In this section we will consider neuroeconomical
evidence regarding the impact of guilt on various dimensions of
altruistic behavior. A recent study has shown that individuals with
higher levels of guilt-proneness (a trait associated with feeling neg-
ative emotions for personal moral violations) consistently made
more ethical choices across different domains (Cohen et al., 2012).
These individuals were less likely to engage in unethical business
decisions such as violating a legal loophole, less likely to lie for
financial gain, or in business negotiations, and less likely to engage
in counter-productive behaviors at the workplace.
The so-called “Prisoner’s Dilemma” (PD) is the most fre-
quently used neuroeconomical paradigm to investigate interper-
sonal cooperation in uncertain environments. Most commonly in
PD, participants interact with a single partner over a one-shot
or an iterated decision between cooperation and defection, in
which the payoffs for any combinations of these decisions are
determined on a pre-defined matrix (see Figure 1). The main
uncertainty in the environment is derived from the lack of infor-
mation regarding the intentions of the partner. It was shown that
communication prior to the experiment in PD increases the fre-
quency of cooperation (Ostrom, 2006). One study investigated
the emotional reactions of responders in the PD where commu-
nication was allowed before the experiment. It was shown that
individuals felt significantly more guilt upon violating a previous
agreement to cooperate, especially when their partners cooper-
ated (Miettinen and Suetens, 2008). Another study investigated
the impact of moral emotions on interpersonal cooperation in
PD. Using computer simulations, the authors showed that in mixed
populations (with equal numbers of altruists and defectors) moral
emotions are important for a social group’s survival (Bazzan et al.,
2002). However, it is important to emphasize that these computa-
tional models consider general principles (i.e., capacity to acquire
moral emotions) as opposed to specific involvement of guilt.
Another laboratory-based study showed that manipulating guilt
in an experimental design increased corporation in PD (Ketelaar
and Au, 2003). The effect of guilt induction was especially signif-
icant for uncooperative individuals when they interacted with a
cooperative strategy (tit for tat ).
Polman and Ruttan (2012) have recently asked whether guilt
had any impact on the way people make moral judgments when
evaluating the behavior of others versus themselves. They defined
moral hypocrisy as people’s tendency to judge others more severely
than they would judge themselves (Polman and Ruttan, 2012).
Intriguingly, following guilt-induction, participants rated their
own moral violations as less acceptable, whereas they acted more
fairly when judging the moral violations of other individuals. This
study suggests that guilt may have a fine-tuning role in adjusting
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic diagram of Prisoner’s Dilemma. In iterated games, players are forced to choose between cooperation and defection in each round
blindly to the other player’s choice. Adapted from Mokros et al. (2008).
perceptions regarding fairness norms. In neuroeconomics, the
Dictator Game (DG) is the most frequently used paradigm to
evaluate how strongly people endorse the fairness norm. This
paradigm is based on an individual’s decision in a single shot
interaction with another person in which the dictator (the active
participant) proposes to split an amount of money received from
the researcher (e.g., for £10; any split above £7 versus £3 is con-
sidered as a fair offer) (Hoffman et al., 1996). In the DG, the
responder is absolutely passive and cannot decline the proposed
amount, whereas any proposal can be declined in the Ultimatum
Game (UG). This difference makes the DG a behavioral method
for monetary quantification of the fairness norm for the proposing
dictator by the amount of money being offered, whereas the Ulti-
matum bargaining models an interaction between two individuals
negotiating for usually an imbalanced equilibrium point of fair-
ness, proverbially trying to establish a point that is “fair enough.”
In the UG, the proposer receives a sum of money from the bank
(often the researcher) and is asked to propose usually an uneven
split. If the responder accepts the split, the money is distributed as
proposed. If the responder rejects the split both sides get nothing.
The rational actor model (Gintis, 2007) suggests that individu-
als should be inclined to accept unfair offers in the UG as any
financial gain is better than zero gain (Loewenstein et al., 2008).
However, empirical evidence suggests that responders only accept
around 50% of the unfair offers (defined as proposals which offer
less than 30% of the total sum) (Harle et al., 2010). In the altru-
ism literature, the amount of money responders sacrifice in order
to punish unfair proposers in the UG is regarded as “altruistic
punishment.”Anthropological research using predictive computer
simulations showed that the frequency of cooperation can only be
maintained in larger groups of individuals when there is costly,
altruistic punishment (Boyd et al., 2003). In these simulated envi-
ronments altruistic punishers, who share a similar payoff with the
cooperator but also incur the costs of punishment, were the sta-
bilizing agents in sustaining the level of cooperation (Boyd et al.,
2003). Therefore, altruistic punishment is an important domain
of altruism, which requires special attention.
Early studies reported that the influence of negative emotions
on rejection of unfair offers is significant even after a cooling off
period lasting 1 h (Bosman et al., 2001). Experimentally induced
guilt by recalling guilt-evoking autobiographical memories leads
to increased offers in the UG in a population of healthy volun-
teers (Ketelaar and Au, 2003). Furthermore, the effects of guilt
emerging from previous unfair offers proposed to an assigned
partner in the UG extend over time and yield similar results of
increased offers in subsequent encounters with the same partner
(Ketelaar and Au, 2003). The latter findings suggest that partic-
ipants display an extended reparative tendency to counter the
effects of the initial guilt-eliciting interaction. Similar results were
reported by another study which showed a significant correlation
between anticipated guilt and the amount of money the proposers
offered in the UG (Nelissen et al., 2011). These authors have also
shown that Ultimatum offers were significantly higher following
a guilt-induction procedure by recalling autobiographical events,
confirming previous findings.
We consider charitable donation behavior to be another impor-
tant domain of altruism. Charitable donation behavior explores
individuals’ interactions with the social environment by measur-
ing their responsiveness to various societal causes weighed against
their selfish monetary interest. It differentiates from the previ-
ously reviewed tasks (PD, DG, and UG) in two respects. Firstly, the
financial impact of charitable donation behavior is far reaching,
relative to the other paradigms which are based on the interac-
tion between two individuals. Secondly, it measures individuals’
responsiveness to concrete societal causes rather than a universally
accepted abstract norm such as “fairness” on which the altruistic
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punishment in the UG is based. In the case of charitable dona-
tions, survivor guilt may motivate individuals to restore a sense
of fairness with respect to a specific societal issue, by making
donations to those who are in need (e.g., it is not fair that chil-
dren in Africa are suffering from malnutrition). A recent study
showed that guilt induction, irrespective of health concerns, sig-
nificantly increased the amount of money people were willing
to donate to cancer research (Polman and Ruttan, 2012). Sec-
ondly, the people who underwent guilt-induction showed similar
preferences for how much other individuals should be donat-
ing to the same cause. There may be parallels between charitable
donation behavior observed in the laboratory and real-life dona-
tion behavior; especially in the case of organ donations. It was
recently shown that anticipated guilt is one of the key factors
influencing people’s decisions to register as organ donors (Wang,
2011). However, another study screening kidney donors, showed
that one in five individuals reported clinically significant levels
of depression following their donation (Wiedebusch et al., 2009).
In post-operative cases, survivor guilt may be an important con-
struct for further investigation, regardless of whether potential
research participants are donors or receivers. It has been pro-
posed that survivor guilt operates with similar principles to that
of a mathematical construct called “the zero-sum game” which
defines limited availability of resources (Blacher, 2000). Under
certain conditions, post-operative patients may report clinically
significant depression when they perceive their current state of
well-being (i.e., surviving a traumatic event) as achieved at the
expense of another person’s misery (i.e., only limited number of
people can survive) (Blacher, 2000). In these situations, the indi-
viduals receiving donations are prone to experiencing survivor
guilt, whereas for generic charitable donations behavior survivor
guilt may motivate individuals to provide financial help to those
who are in need. On the other hand, it is important to highlight
that the interpersonal bargaining games that we reviewed in this
section (such as UG and DG), adhere to the rules of zero-sum
games and therefore, these paradigms may also be effective for
probing survivor guilt when proposers decide to keep the bigger
proportion of the stake. Considering other studies which showed
that making charitable donations is important for psychological
well-being (Anik et al., 2009), it is hard to come up with a uniform
model for donation behavior which is solely driven by either neg-
ative or positive emotions and explain donation behavior across
different modalities. Whilst conceptually discussing the impact
of personal motivations on altruistic behavior, helping behavior
resulting from a need to feel “warm glow” or ward off nega-
tive emotions can was framed as impurely altruistic (Andreoni,
1990).
THE ROLE OF SHAME
The impact of shame on social-economical decision making has
been widely neglected as a research question. One study investi-
gated the threat of shame in anonymous public goods game and
showed that it led to higher levels of contributions to the com-
mon pool (Jacquet et al., 2011). A public goods game is played
in a multiplayer environment in which each player contributes a
proportion of their endowment to a common pool. The amount
collected in the common pool is escalated by a pre-defined factor
and then evenly distributed back to the players. In these experi-
ments, Jacquet et al. (2011) manipulated the threat of shame by
revealing the identity of two of the least generous/cooperative indi-
viduals. In a more recent study, the same research group argued
that the evolutionary/moral function of a threat of shame is com-
parable to costly altruistic punishment and it has a fundamental
role in sustaining cooperation in society (Jacquet et al., 2012). Fol-
lowing Tangney’s hypothesis regarding the negative influence of
acute shame on altruistic behavior, de Hooge et al. (2007) asked
whether guilt and shame have opposing effects on interpersonal
cooperation. They used an interpersonal donations paradigm in
which the value of the endowment was escalated for the donatee
(de Hooge et al., 2007). They showed that guilt promoted cooper-
ation only in selfish individuals, whereas they did not provide any
support for shame to be reducing altruism, contrary to Tangney’s
hypothesis. In a later work, these authors aimed to differentiate
the prosocial influence of shame by investigating the nature of the
shame-eliciting event and its relevance to the decision-making task
(de Hooge et al., 2008). They raised a general question about mood
induction paradigms and suggested that emotions triggered by an
external cause (i.e., exogenous) should have limited influence on
decision-making. These exogenous manipulations include exper-
imental conditions when participants are manipulated to feel an
emotion that would not normally arise from the decision-making
context. Using the same interpersonal monetary donations game,
they show that only endogenous shame lead to significantly higher
levels of contributions only in selfish individuals, regardless of
whether it was imagined, recalled, or currently experienced.
Earlier studies manipulated the social distance between inter-
acting individuals. Increasing social distance as a result of escaping
from a shame-eliciting situation has been purported as one of
the behavioral manifestations of incidental shame (Tangney et al.,
2007). It has been shown that an experimentally increased social
distance by increasing the level of anonymity between players in
the DG resulted in lower proposals in a population of healthy
volunteers (Hoffman et al., 1996). This study suggests that increas-
ing the social distance leads to compromises in the perception of
fairness and actual cooperative behavior. This finding supports
one hypothesis proposing that shame serves to reduce altruistic
behavior (Tangney et al., 1996) through mechanisms of increas-
ing social distance (Tangney et al., 2007). De Jong et al. (2002)
investigated whether the physiological manifestations of shame
communicated intentions to sustain cooperation in the PD. They
suggested that prosocial individuals who were forced to defect had
significantly higher levels of self-reported shame, skin conduc-
tance, and face coloration response (De Jong et al., 2002). However,
the intensity of these physical manifestations was not sufficient to
maintain the social credibility of the defecting individuals in the
eyes of the victim of the defection. Another study compared par-
ticipants’ reactions to unfair proposals offered by either human or
computer partners (van’t Wout et al., 2006). Overall, individuals
accepted unfair offers at a higher rate when they came from com-
puter partners. Furthermore, rejection rates for the unfair offers
correlated significantly with skin conductance activity when these
offers came from human partners. Considering the physiological
manifestations of shame, this study may suggest that shame could
also promote altruistic punishment in healthy subjects.
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We have previously mentioned that healthy functioning of
moral emotions can only be conceived within an appropriate
context. For example, blaming oneself following unfair treatment
would be pathological. This issue was later investigated in healthy
subjects and it was shown that participants did not display any
feelings of shame relative to other outwardly directed negative
emotions such as envy, anger, irritation, or contempt following
unfair offers in the UG, in line with our perspective (Bosman
et al., 2001).
THE IMPACT OF DEPRESSION
The debate surrounding the relationship between altruistic behav-
ior and depression has been mostly theoretical and best to our
knowledge, there is no neuroeconomical evidence to support it.
The main limitation of the pathological altruism hypothesis is that
it does not differentiate between different types of altruism as we
have reviewed in the previous sections. Secondly, the majority of
the studies supporting this hypothesis are based on self-reported
behavioral tendencies as opposed to actual behavioral choice in
neuroeconomical paradigms. For example, one retrospective sur-
vey suggested that making charitable donations is associated with
vulnerability to MDD (Fujiwara, 2009). In this study, the author
followed up people who participated in a national survey 10 years
ago, and assessed individual tendencies for altruistic behaviors via
an e-mail survey. According to the results of the survey, Fujiwara
claims that providing emotional and financial support exceeding
$10 per month constitutes harmful effects which may be consid-
ered as a risk factor for MDD. Although survey studies reach out to
larger populations, they may bear significant confounding factors
such as social desirability or inaccurate responses. We propose that
neuroeconomical paradigms, together with studies investigating
self-reported behavioral tendencies, would improve our under-
standing of social impairments in MDD. Similar opinions have
been recently expressed by other authors (Ernst, 2012).
Earlier studies using the PD showed that individuals with self-
reported depressive symptoms defected at a significantly higher
rate when they were assigned to a high-power role, exploiting
the vulnerability set by the individuals in the low power role
(Hokanson et al., 1980). In this experiment, the individuals in
the low power role were asked to make a decision openly and
before the individuals in the high-power role, therefore making
them vulnerable to defection. However, another study reported
that people with depressive symptoms were more likely to give an
aggressive response to betrayal in the PD compared with healthy
controls (Haley and Strickland, 1986). This pattern may suggest
that individuals with depressive symptoms process moral viola-
tions differently when they are the agent or the victim of such
violations. Despite higher levels of negative emotions in the face
of defection in the PD, one study showed that patients with MDD
had significantly higher acceptance rates for unfair offers in the
iterated UG, punishing unfair players less than healthy subjects
would do (Harle et al., 2010). However, a more recent study showed
no significant differences between patients and healthy subjects in
terms of acceptance rates, although patients made more frequent
fair proposals when they were playing as the proposer (Destoop
et al., 2012). Taken together, these findings support the view that
following undesirable social outcomes, patients with MDD may
feel negative emotions more intensely, yet under certain condi-
tions these emotions may not translate into punishing behavior.
There are few previous studies which investigated the impact of
affective states on Ultimatum bargaining. Bosman et al. (2001)
investigated the impact of emotions on rejecting unfair offers in
the one-shot UG in healthy subjects. They showed that sadness
was significantly higher in subjects who rejected the unfair pro-
posals compared with those who accepted them. Further, they
showed that the intensity of sadness significantly increased the
probability of unfair offers being rejected. In their earlier work,
Harlé and Sanfey (2007) questioned the impact of acute sad-
ness on decision-making in the UG. They showed that incidental
sad mood disturbed mechanisms associated with a rational actor
model of decision making, and participants who underwent sad
mood induction rejected unfair offers more frequently (Harlé and
Sanfey, 2007). We think that findings reported by Harlé and Sanfey
are important as they suggest that impairments in social decision-
making mechanisms in patients with MDD are different to the
impairments caused by external mood induction.
As is evident from our review, social-economical decision-
making studies in MDD are very limited, and it is certainly
not possible to argue for selective deficits in neuroeconomical
decision-making. The other area of psychopathology where these
paradigms have been used is psychopathy. Interestingly, a lack
of guilt has been hypothesized in psychopathy which is directly
opposite to the proposed exaggerated manifestation of guilt in
MDD. The findings which we will briefly review below may suggest
that neuroeconomical paradigms are sensitive to detecting these
opposing aspects of psychopathology. For example, it was shown
that individuals with high psychopathic tendencies accepted unfair
offers in the UG at a significantly higher rate than healthy sub-
jects (Osumi and Ohira, 2010). The authors proposed that the
affective impairment in individuals with high psychopathic ten-
dencies, as measured by skin conductance, is not necessarily a
maladaptive one but can be linked to successful adaptations to
the social environment (Harpending and Sobus, 1987; Osumi and
Ohira, 2010). Another study compared primary and secondary
psychopaths with healthy subjects, and showed that only primary
psychopaths displayed hypervigilant punishing behavior in the
UG (Koenigs et al., 2010). This finding highlights the possibil-
ity of using neuroeconomical measures to probe aberrant social
decision-making in clinical populations, potentially revealing dif-
ferent profiles within the same clinical diagnostic group. Behavior
of inpatient psychopaths has also been associated with a higher
payoff defecting strategy in a social variant of the PD in which
participants interacted over daily rations of water in a survival
situation (Mokros et al., 2008). The authors suggested that the
game behavior validly reflects real-life decision making and that
the amount of environmental rewards obtained by the inpatients
may reduce motivation for recovery.
NEUROMODULATORY AND NEUROIMAGING STUDIES
It is possible that social impairments associated with MDD have
neuronal origins. However, whether these impairments are caused
by structural differences in cytoarchitecture existing before the
onset of MDD, or caused by the scaring effect of recurrent episodes
remains unknown. It was recently shown that in asymptomatic
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patients with MDD there is hypoactivation to pictures of social
interactions (irrespective of valence) in regions of the brain asso-
ciated with behavioral planning (Elliott et al., 2012). This may
suggest that social decision-making deficits reviewed in the pre-
vious sections may originate from disruptions in neural networks
purported to mediate social perspective taking and planning. In
this section we will consider evidence from neuroimaging and
neuromodulatory studies in order to identify potential neuronal
correlates of moral emotions in depression.
Zak proposed a triangular model in which he considered
the influence of oxytocin, serotonin, and dopamine on guiding
human social behavior. He suggested that these neurochemicals
act selectively on affiliative bonding, mood states, and reward
mechanisms respectively (Zak, 2011). In successive UG exper-
iments, it was shown that oxytocin promoted generosity and
increased the magnitude of the UG offers significantly, whereas
inhibiting oxytocin binding reduced both generosity and the mag-
nitude of the offers, while increasing the threshold for altruistic
punishment (Zak, 2011). Another study showed that a genetic
polymorphism associated with the oxytocin receptor may have
a direct influence on the amount of money people offered in
DG interactions (Israel et al., 2009), providing further support
for the role of oxytocin in guiding such altruistic decisions. Later
studies investigated whether oxytocin enhances different kinds of
behaviors associated with altruism. It was shown that intranasal
oxytocin infusion promotes hyper-altruism toward in-group-
members and territorial/defensive aggression toward out-group
members; a behavioral strategy defined as parochial altruism
(De Dreu et al., 2010). Impact of oxytocin on in-group hyper-
altruism behavior was reproduced whereby individuals having
oxytocin infusion significantly increased the amount of money
they donated to humanitarian charities providing help to their in-
group-members (Barraza et al., 2011). In healthy subjects under-
going brain scan, it was recently shown that oxytocin augmented
caudate response to reciprocated cooperation, possibly enhanc-
ing the neural response to social rewards (Rilling et al., 2012).
Rilling et al. (2012) also showed that oxytocin augments left
amygdala activation to altruistic decisions and further enhanc-
ing functional connectivity between amygdala and anterior insula.
Taken together, these studies provide support for the argument
that oxytocin promotes altruistic behavior by enhancing affiliative
feelings.
Other studies investigated the impact of acute manipulation
of serotonin (which is one of the key neurotransmitters impli-
cated in MDD) on interpersonal cooperation in the PD as well
as altruistic punishment in the UG. It was shown that acute
tryptophan depletion significantly impaired interpersonal coop-
eration in healthy subjects. Participants in a PD game showed
reduced cooperation with playing partners who they were encoun-
tering for the first time, but not during subsequent encounters
(Wood et al., 2006). In UG studies, it was shown that lowering
serotonin levels by acute tryptophan depletion increased the fre-
quency of altruistic punishment, whereas serotonin loading by
acute citalopram increased the frequency of acceptance of unfair
offers (Crockett et al., 2008, 2010). Also considering the evidence
previously reported by Harlé and Sanfey (2007), the UG studies
suggest that profiles for altruistic punishment between patients
with MDD, individuals who underwent low mood induction and
neurotransmitter manipulation are different from each other.
In their seminal study, Greene et al. (2001) showed that per-
sonal (taking active physical role) moral violations activated the
frontopolar cortex (BA 10) significantly relative to non-moral con-
ditions. Although this study was very influential in triggering sci-
entific interest in the neural basis of moral reasoning, the dilemmas
used in this study and many subsequent others, force individuals
to choose between two outcomes involving harming somebody.
A typical example is the “runaway train dilemma” where a train
is rapidly approaching five people, but pushing a single individ-
ual onto the tracks would bring the train to a stop saving the five
(Greene et al., 2001). Participants must choose whether or not to
push the individual onto the track. Although such dilemmas may
produce robust activations by triggering utilitarian evaluation of
the value of life, they have limited correspondence to our everyday
lives. Therefore, we think that studies using interpersonal cooper-
ation, bargaining, and donation paradigms have more ecological
validity in understanding the neural basis of social perception and
moral decision-making. In the PD paradigm, reciprocal coopera-
tion is associated with activations in nucleus accumbens, caudate,
vmPFC, and ACC, whereas deactivations in ACC and dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) were associated with defection when the
partner cooperated; both of these activations correlating signifi-
cantly with self-reported psychopathy scores (Rilling et al., 2002,
2007). Another study showed that during reciprocal exchange,
altruistic individuals activated the frontopolar cortex more when
they interacted with human partners compared with computer
partners (McCabe et al., 2001). In the UG paradigms, receiving
unfair offers activated the dorsal section of the ACC, whereas activ-
ity in the right anterior insula correlated significantly negatively
with the frequency at which the unfair offers were accepted (San-
fey et al., 2003). One subsequent study, using PET imaging in an
interpersonal reciprocal exchange paradigm, showed that healthy
subjects activated the right dorsal caudate nucleus when they could
effectively punish unfair individuals (de Quervain et al., 2004).
The role of the dorsal ACC in evaluation of players in inter-
personal economic exchanges has been a topic of interest as such
evaluations are important in guiding decisions whether or not to
punish unfair players. During their evaluation of the active par-
ticipants, observers activated anterior insula and ACC when fair
participants received unfair electric shocks, whereas activations
related to empathic concern were significantly reduced in male
participants when they observed unfair players receiving electric
shocks (Singer et al., 2006). The involvement of dorsal ACC and
right anterior insula in altruistic punishment was reproduced by
a more recent study using the impunity game paradigm, which is
a variant of the UG in which the amount the proposer designated
for him/herself is immune to the punishment of the responder
(Takagishi et al., 2009).
The lesion literature suggests that ventral parts of the pre-
frontal cortex are involved in neuroeconomic decisions. Koenigs
and colleagues showed that vmPFC is an important region guid-
ing altruistic punishment decisions in the UG (Koenigs et al.,
2010). Similarly in patients with bilateral vmPFC lesions, it was
shown that patients offered significantly less in the DG and
demanded significantly more than what they offered in the UG
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Table 2 |The list of key literature using neuroeconomical paradigms.
Reference Sample Method Moral
emotion
Paradigm Main conclusion
Polman and Ruttan (2012) Healthy subjects Behavioral Guilt Donations Guilt reduces moral hypocrisy
Destoop et al. (2012) MDD Behavioral – UG No difference of acceptance frequency between
patients and controls
Nelissen et al. (2011) Healthy subjects Behavioral Guilt UG Anticipated guilt correlates with the amount of money
offered
Jacquet et al. (2011) Healthy subjects Behavioral Shame Public goods Threat of shame increased the amount of donations
Zak (2011) Healthy subjects Neuro modulation – UG Oxytocin increases offers, inhibiting its binding
reduces generosity
Harle et al. (2010) MDD Behavioral – UG Patients accept unfair offers at a higher rate than
controls
Koenigs et al. (2010) Psychopaths Behavioral – UG/DG Higher altruistic punishment but lower dictator offers
in primary psychopaths
Izuma et al. (2010) Healthy subjects FMRI – Donations Ventral striatum activation for donations in the
presence of social audience
Osumi and Ohira (2010) Psychopaths Behavioral – UG Psychopathic individuals accept unfair offers at a
higher rate
Krajbich et al. (2009) vmPFC patients FMRI – UG/DG Patients make lower dictator offers
Miettinen and Suetens
(2008)
Healthy subjects Behavioral Guilt PD Defectors feel guilt when they violate previous
cooperative agreements
de Hooge et al. (2008) Healthy subjects Behavioral Shame Donations Endogenous shame promotes interpersonal donations
Crockett et al. (2008) Healthy subjects Neuro modulation – UG Acute tryptophan depletion increases altruistic
punishment
Mokros et al. (2008) Psychopaths Behavioral – PD Inpatient psychopaths defect significantly more than
controls
de Hooge et al. (2007) Healthy subjects Behavioral Guilt/Shame Donations Guilt promotes interpersonal donations, shame does
not have any impact
Rilling et al. (2007) Subclinical FMRI – PD Deactivation of ACC for decisions to defect
Singer et al. (2006) Healthy subjects FMRI – PD Empathic responses in ACC and anterior insula when
fair participants are punished with an electric shock
Knoch et al. (2006) Healthy subjects Behavioral – UG Disrupting right dlPFC diminishes altruistic
punishment
Moll et al. (2006) Healthy subjects FMRI – Donations sgACC activation for decisions to make donations
Sanfey et al. (2003) Healthy subjects FMRI – UG Right anterior insula activation for altruistic
punishment
Ketelaar and Au (2003) Healthy subjects Behavioral Guilt PD/UG Guilt increased cooperation and the amount of money
offered
Hoffman et al. (1996) Healthy subjects Behavioral – DG Increasing social distance reduces dictator offers
Hokanson et al. (1980) Subclinical Behavioral – PD Depressed individuals defected more in the
high-power role
Studies were listed chronologically (the most recent first), so that advancements and limitations in this field of research can be observed.
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(Krajbich et al., 2009). Considering the lesion evidence about
functional neuroanatomy of guilt in the vmPFC, it is possible
that a diminished sense of guilt disrupts regulatory mechanisms
which influence these interpersonal financial decisions. Experi-
mental studies showed that disrupting brain activation may have
influence on altruistic punishment decisions. Using transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS), which employs an external electro-
magnetic pulse to disrupt brain activity in cortical regions, Knoch
et al. (2006) demonstrated that temporarily disrupting function of
right dlPFC diminished altruistic punishment without changing
perceptions about the fairness of proposals only when participants
interacted with human partners. Another similar methodology is
transcranial direct current stimulation, by which brain activity
in certain cortical regions is disrupted by delivering a low cur-
rent through external electrodes. Using this methodology, results
obtained by TMS were reproduced, highlighting the role of the
right dlPFC in guiding such altruistic decisions (Knoch et al.,
2008).
Charitable donation paradigms are also important for neu-
roeconomical studies. Moll et al. (2006) not only explored the
functional neuroanatomy of mechanisms which modulate deci-
sions to make donations, but also those associated with decisions
to “punish” charitable organizations when they work counter to
participants’ social and moral values. This study managed to
incorporate both aspects of human altruistic behavior (costly
cooperation and altruistic punishment), also defined as “strong
reciprocity” (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). They showed that sep-
tal and subgenual cingulate regions showed selective activation for
decisions to donate relative to a pure monetary reward condition,
whereas the activity in ventral striatum was shared for donation
and monetary reward. Furthermore, they showed that decisions
involving opposition activated lateral orbitofrontal regions and
anterior insula bilaterally (Moll et al., 2006). Finally, they showed
that activation in the anterior orbitofrontal and frontopolar cor-
tices correlated significantly with the amount of real-life altru-
istic engagement. Subsequent studies demonstrated that ventral
striatum and the septal region showed activation irrespective of
whether the donations were voluntary or not (Harbaugh et al.,
2007). More recently, a study showed significant ventral striatum
activity for social approval when people make donations in the
presence of a social audience, providing further information about
the role of ventral striatum in social reward processing (Izuma
et al., 2010). Izuma and colleagues did not report any specific
regions for selfish decisions in this donations paradigm. However,
we think that this paradigm may be effective in probing guilt when
people make selfish decisions when the social audience is absent;
and shame, when the selfish decision is made in the presence of a
social audience. Finally, in an interpersonal charitable donations
paradigm it was shown that selfish monetary decisions deactivated
vmPFC even when these decisions were more equitable based on
FIGURE 2 | (A) Schematic diagram showing influence of MDD on altruistic
behavior. The model considers the impact of the mood state along with
abnormally elevated self-blaming feelings (guilt and shame). The proposed
model also considers different types of altruism, such as cooperation,
altruistic punishment, and making donations. (B). Mapping of MNI
coordinates of the peak region of activations of the reviewed
neuroimaging literature. The studies which were included were not
selected based on a systematic review of the literature. The color coding
refers to the colors in (A) (e.g., green marks specifying activations
selective for guilt). “R” denotes right hemisphere. There may be slight
distortions when converting 3D images onto 2D T1 structural anatomical
template. All mapping remains accurate within structural neuroanatomical
label of the regions. Reviewed evidence suggests that frontopolar,
ventromedial, right dorsolateral PFC; dorsal and subgenual ACC, striatum
and amygdala are important regions of interest (ROIs) for studying
affective disturbances and social-economical decision making in MDD.
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the evaluation of the magnitude of the financial reward (Zaki and
Mitchell, 2011). Considering the previous evidence regarding the
role of vmPFC in guilt processing, it is possible to speculate that
such selfish decisions required inhibition of guilt. Secondly, the
reason why this study did not report any striatal activation may be
because helping random individuals who do not give any distress
signal may not be sufficient to activate regions selective for socially
rewarding decisions, which is required for altruistic behavior.
SECTION SUMMARY
In this section, we have reviewed literature (summarized in
Table 2) investigating the influence of self-blaming moral emo-
tions and depression on decision-making in neuroeconomical
paradigms. The studies with guilt-induction consistently show
that guilt promotes altruistic behavior, whereas the findings
are somewhat ambiguous for studies with shame induction.
There are very few studies conducted in patients with MDD.
We suggest that MDD diagnosis and accompanying elevation in
self-blaming feelings exert an influence on altruistic behavior,
as shown schematically in Figure 2A. Functional neuroimaging
studies suggest that decisions in neuroeconomical paradigms acti-
vate regions of the PFC, insular cortex, and subcortical regions
which are purported to mediate reward processing. MDD has
been associated with structural and functional abnormalities in
these fronto-mesolimbic pathways (see Figure 2B legend).
CONCLUSION AND FINAL WORD
In the present opinion paper, we have argued that MDD is associ-
ated with elevated proneness to guilt and shame. We highlighted
the possible overlap in the functional neuroanatomy of guilt and
shame with regions known to be functionally abnormal in MDD,
and emphasized a need for more neuroimaging studies to disso-
ciate the functional neuroanatomy of guilt and shame in patients
with MDD. Following the suggestions of previous authors, we con-
sidered the idea that guilt and shame can be differentiated based on
their influence on social-economical decision making. We showed
that there is converging literature supporting a positive impact
of guilt on altruistic decisions; however literature on the impact
of shame is inconclusive. Studies of social-economical decision
making to date have focused on healthy populations. Considering
coexisting emotional processing abnormalities in MDD, it is more
challenging to dissociate the impact of moral emotions on social-
economical decision making in clinical populations. In order to
address this issue, we have argued in this opinion paper that using
functional imaging with neuroeconomical paradigms could be an
important direction for future psychiatric research.
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